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Just over 100 years ago the ﬁrst epidemic of meningo-
coccal meningitis was described in Africa [1]. This
epidemic probably started in northern Nigeria and
spread rapidly westwards reaching present-dayGhana
in 1906 where its epidemiological features including
its size, high attack rate and seasonality were well
described by Horn [2]. During the subsequent 100
years large epidemics of meningococcal meningitis
have occurred every few years in countries of the
Sahel and sub-Sahel, the African meningitis belt.
These have shown little diﬀerence in their major
epidemiological characteristics from those of the epi-
demic described by Horn [2]. Nevertheless the simi-
larity of these epidemics disguises the fact that over
the years some subtle changes have been taking place.
The capsular serogroup of the meningococci re-
sponsible for the ﬁrst African epidemics of cerebro-
spinal meningitis is not known. However, typing of
isolates obtained from across Africa during the 1940s
and 1950s yielded predominantly serogroup A iso-
lates and at the time that Lapeyssonnie published his
classical account of meningococcal disease in Africa
in 1963 [3] it was generally assumed that all major
epidemics of meningococcal disease in Africa were
caused by meningococci belonging to this serogroup.
Reports of epidemics in the 1970s in Nigeria [4] and
Burkina Faso [5] in which a substantial number of
isolates belonged to serogroup C showed that non-
serogroup A meningococci have epidemic potential
but these outbreaks were considered to be anomalies.
This view was comprehensively demolished by the
occurrence in 2002 of a large epidemic of meningo-
coccal disease in Burkina Faso which was caused
predominantly by meningococci belonging to sero-
group W135 [6]. This outbreak led to fears that a
massive epidemic of serogroup W135 meningococcal
meningitis might sweep across Africa with devastating
eﬀects in a non-immune population. Fortunately, this
has not happened, but cases of W135 meningitis have
continued to occur in Burkina Faso and neighbour-
ing countries, often cohabiting with serogroup A
meningococci. Recently, the story has taken an even
more remarkable turn with the report of a major epi-
demic of over 4000 cases of meningococcal disease in
Niger in 2006 caused in a large part by meningococci
belonging to serogroup X. In southwestern Niger
meningococci belonging to this serogroup were re-
sponsible for 90% of cases [7].
The advent of major epidemics of serogroup W135
and serogroup X meningococcal infections in Africa
raises a number of important questions. Where did
the epidemic strains of bacteria come from?, what set
oﬀ the epidemics caused by these strains?, and what
can be done to contain them?
It might be anticipated that major epidemics of
meningococcal disease in the African meningitis belt
would be initiated by the introduction of a new strain
from outside the belt, to which the local population
had little immunity. There is evidence that this may
have happened at least once in the case of serogroup
A epidemics [8] and a possible explanation for the
Burkina Faso epidemic is the introduction of the
W135 strain by pilgrims returning from Mecca and
Medina where serogroup W135 meningococci were
responsible for a large proportion of meningococcal
infections at the time of that outbreak [9]. How-
ever, acceptance of this apparently straightforward
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explanation is complicated by the fact that strains of
serogroup W135 meningococci similar to the strain
responsible for the epidemic in Burkina Faso have
been circulating in West Africa for many years and
were shown to be capable of causing invasive disease
[10, 11]. A similar situation pertains in relation to
the serogroup X epidemic in Niger in 2006. Although
this was the ﬁrst large epidemic to be caused by
meningococci of this serogroup, isolated cases and
small outbreaks of serogroup X disease have been
recorded in several West African countries including
Niger and Ghana in the past [12, 13]. What gave
these bacteria, previously thought to be of relatively
low virulence, the ability to cause major epidemics?
Was this the acquisition of some new virulence factor
by the epidemic strains of meningococci or could it
have been due to some environmental change? No
virulence factor has been identiﬁed to support the
ﬁrst hypothesis. Might the emergence of serogroup
W135 and X meningococci be due to the selective
advantage given to meningococci belonging to these
serogroups by widespread vaccinations with sero-
group A+C meningococcal polysaccharides? In the
past 20 years, A+C meningococcal polysaccharide
vaccines have been used extensively in the African
meningitis belt to contain epidemics and many
millions of doses have been given. Experience with
pneumococcal conjugate vaccines has shown that
vaccination can lead to serotype replacement so on
ﬁrst consideration this seems a credible explanation
for the occurrence of W135 and X epidemics. How-
ever, there are several reasons which make this an
unlikely explanation for what has occurred. First,
there is little to suggest that in Africa meningococcal
A+C polysaccharide vaccines have any major impact
on the prevalence of nasopharyngeal carriage of
meningococci and it is in the nasopharynx that any
selection would take place. Second, the use of sero-
group C conjugate vaccines, which have had a major
impact on carriage in the United Kingdom and else-
where, has not so far been associated with any sig-
niﬁcant serotype replacement in disease or carriage,
perhaps because of the generally low prevalence of
carriage with serogroup C strains in these communi-
ties. Finally, epidemiological studies in Burkina Faso
and now in Niger have not shown any clear associ-
ation at the regional level between attack rates with
W135 or X meningitis and previous vaccination with
A+C polysaccharide vaccines. The role of prior
vaccination cannot be excluded, as polysaccharide
vaccines might have a more subtle eﬀect on carriage
than detected by simple cross-sectional surveys but, at
present, this seems to be an unlikely cause of these
epidemics.
Very few longitudinal studies of nasopharyneal
carriage of meningococci have been undertaken in
Africa but those that have, in particular an important
study undertaken in northern Ghana [12], have shown
that even over a fairly short period of time there
are changes in the predominant serogroup of the
meningococci present in the nasopharynx of asymp-
tomatic carriers. These changes reﬂect natural cycles
of infection and immunity that occur independently
of any eﬀect of vaccination. Perhaps epidemics of
non-serogroup A meningococcal disease occur when
the environmental factors that predispose to a major
epidemic such as low absolute humidity, dust and
possibly social factors occur at a time and place when
a non-serogroup A meningococcus is at the peak of
one of these natural waves.
The public health consequences of these recent
changes in the epidemiology of meningococcal infec-
tion in Africa are serious. Although the sudden
appearance of a serogroup W135 epidemic in Burkina
Faso in 2002 was not followed by a massive epidemic
across Africa, it is not clear why this did not happen
as the limited number of studies that have been
done have shown low background W135 bactericidal
antibody concentrations in countries in the meningitis
belt. An A,C,Y,W135 polysaccharide vaccine is
available in limited amounts but it is too expensive
for epidemic control as this vaccine is targeted pri-
marily at protecting pilgrims and travellers to at-risk
areas. This problem was overcome in an imaginative
way by removing the serogroup Y polysaccharide
component of the quadrivalent vaccine, thus in-
validating it as a vaccine that could be used by
pilgrims, but making it possible for the manufacturer
to make this available for epidemic control at an
aﬀordable cost. This trivalent vaccine has been
deployed widely in Burkina Faso with success. How-
ever, the advent of a serogroup X epidemic poses an
even more diﬃcult problem as there is currently no
serogroup X vaccine commercially available even
within a multivalent vaccine. Is the serogroup X strain
responsible for the epidemic in Niger going to spread
into neighbouring countries, for example northern
Nigeria with its massive population or even to areas
outside the meningitis belt? Should a crash pro-
gramme be undertaken to produce a serogroup X
vaccine and if so, who would be prepared to do this
if the only market for the vaccine would be in Africa?
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On the other hand will serogroup X disease disappear
with acquisition of naturally acquired immunity fol-
lowing widespread nasopharyngeal carriage with the
epidemic strain? Unfortunately, our lack of knowl-
edge of the factors that govern the peculiar epidemi-
ology of meningococcal disease in Africa means that
we can only guess.
DECLARATION OF INTEREST
None.
REFERENCES
1. Greenwood BM. Meningococcal meningitis in Africa.
Transactions of the Royal Society of Tropical Medicine
and Hygiene 1999; 93 : 341–353.
2. Horn AE. Report on an investigation of cerebrospinal
fever in the northern territories of the Gold Coast in
1908. Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene 1908;
11 : 358–365.
3. Lapeyssonie L. Cerebrospinal meningitis in Africa [in
French]. Bulletin of the World Health Organization
1963; 28 (Suppl.) : 3–114.
4. Whittle HC, et al.Group Cmeningococcal meningitis in
the northern savannah of Africa. Lancet 1975; 1 : 1377.
5. Broome CV, et al. Epidemic group C meningococcal
meningitis in Upper Volta, 1979. Bulletin of the World
Health Organization 1983; 61 : 325–330.
6. Decosas J, Koama J-BT. Chronicle of an outbreak
foretold: meningococcal meningitis W135 in Burkina
Faso. Lancet Infectious Diseases 2002; 2 : 663–765.
7. Boisier P, et al. Meningococcal meningitis : unpre-
cedented incidence of serogroup X-related cases in
2006 in Niger. Clinical Infectious Diseases 2007; 44 :
657–673.
8. Achtman M. Molecular epidemiology of epidemic
bacterial meningitis. Reviews of Medical Microbiology
1990; 1 : 29–38.
9. Lingappa JR, et al. Serogroup W-135 meningococcal
disease during the Hajj, 2000. Emerging Infectious
Diseases 2003; 9 : 665–671.
10. Denis F, et al. Emergence of meningococcal meningitis
caused by W135 subgroups in Africa. Lancet 1982; ii :
1335–1336.
11. Kwara A, et al. Meningitis caused by a serogroup W135
clone of the ET-37 complex of Neisseria meningitidis
in West Africa. Tropical Medicine and International
Health 1998; 3 : 742–746.
12. Gagneux SP, et al. Prospective study of a sero-
group X Neisseria meningitidis outbreak in northern
Ghana. Journal of Infectious Diseases 2002; 185 : 618–
626.
13. Djibo S, et al.Outbreaks of serogroup X meningococcal
meningitis in Niger 1995–2000. Tropical Medicine and
International Health 2003; 8 : 1118–1123.
Meningococcal disease in West Africa 705
